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1. The first announcement of the present "International Seminar on 
Indology: Past, Present and Future" contains some challenging questions, 
which I would like to cite in context. We read there: 
 
Indology is, of recent, being looked at as an East-West encounter; philosophers 
of this century express their view that the time has come to reach beyond 
‘occident’ and ‘orient’. In his study, India and Europe, W. Halbfass observes: 
In the modern planetary situation Eastern and Western ‘cultures’ can no longer meet 
one another as equal partners. They meet in a westernized world, under conditions 
shaped by Western ways of thinking. ... 
If this is true, is ‘European’ or ‘Western’ discourse the destiny of Indology? 
Will the Neo-Hindu attempts to ‘actualize’ ancient Indian teachings for the 
present succeed in establishing a stronger alternative? Will there ever be an 
‘Indian discourse’ in Indology? Could such a discourse serve as the best solution 
for the present predicament? 
 
There is of course no way of denying that Indology was initially a 
European enterprise, carried out by European scholars, either in India or in 
Europe, either with the help of Indian pandits or without them. In this 
sense, Indology originally was characterized by ‘European’ or ‘Western’ 
discourse. Many of its themes and preconceptions were determined by the 
European context. I have dealt with a few of them in an earlier publication.1 
One is the conviction that the oldest literature of India, i.e. the Veda, must 
be extremely old. This conviction seems to find favour with some modern 
Indian scholars, but for its origin we may have to look at the European 
romantic period. The idea that India is, and has always been, a place of 
spiritual wisdom, too, is very old in Europe. It dates back to the Greeks, 
and has persisted for some two thousand years. 
                                                
1 "L'indianisme et les préjugés occidentaux." Études de Lettres, avril juin 1989, pp. 119-136. 
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 However, even though Indology was originally characterized by 
European concerns and preconceptions, and even though it may have a 
hard time to rid itself of these, I am reluctant to call Indology in general 
‘European’ or ‘Western discourse’. We all know that, for reasons that are 
very difficult to determine with precision, some extremely important 
historical changes took place in Europe, or in North America, before they 
spread elsewhere. The ‘scientific’ and ‘industrial revolutions’ took first 
place in Europe, but obviously transcend any regional culture. The first 
cars were produced in the United States, but the most efficient car makers 
at this moment may well be the Japanese. Computers, too, were invented in 
the West, but the most competent programmers at present may well be 
Indians.2 What I mean to say is that the developments just mentioned are 
global developments, which for reasons that are far from evident started in 
particular regions. Other contributions to global culture have begun in other 
parts of the world: gun powder perhaps in China, the decimal place value 
notation perhaps in India. All these developments and discoveries are not 
just expressions of some regional culture. They transcend it, and may 
indeed occasionally prove to be more fruitful in cultures different from the 
one that invented it. 
 Scholarly discourse, as I see it, is one such thing. It is global rather 
than confined to one culture. It may have begun in Europe, but it is 
essentially no more European than any of the other things I have just 
mentioned.3 It is not my intention to try to define what it consists in. This I 
willingly leave to others. One element of scholarly discourse — and of 
scientific discourse in general — I would however like to emphasize: its 
readiness to accept criticism, and its attempts to deal with it, and this in all 
domains, including those normally covered by tradition, religion, 
revelation, or insight. This is what I call ‘rationality’.4 This use of the term 
                                                
2 Similarly Gellner, 1995: 4: "This inequality of cognitive styles does not engender a hierarchy of peoples 
and cultures. It is not the by-product of the genetic equipment of any particular population pool. The 
population or culture where this style was born would have been wholly incapable of producing it a few 
generations earlier than it actually occurred; and since it has happened, other populations have acquired 
this style with ease, and some of them have conspicuously surpassed the originators of science, when it 
comes to the business of technological application of the New Science. The new knowledge is not the 
reward or mark of some general excellence. Nevertheless, the asymmetry of cognitive and productive 
performance is the most important single fact about our world." 
3 Albrecht Wezler and Michael Witzel, in their Foreword to the Series Indian Philology and South Asian 
Studies (1995: vii) speak of "Western norms and approaches" as distinguished from the "Indian ßåstric 
sciences". It would seem to be more appropriate to speak in this context of "modern norms and 
approaches" or the like, the more so since the two authors find fault, on the very same page, with Western 
methods in the 19th century. 
4 This idea of rationality has little to do with he presence or otherwise of logical rules like the law of the 
excluded middle, and even less with the economic rationality emphasized by Max Weber and others. 
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may seem to be somewhat unusual, but is not without precedents; the 
philosopher of science Karl Popper used it in much the same manner.5 
Rationality in this sense is, I believe, a vital ingredient of all scientific and 
scholarly discourse. I realize that rationality alone may not be sufficient to 
obtain the results of science and scholarship. The European Middle Ages 
had a tradition of rationality, i.e. of critical debate (be it that its scope was 
rather limited),6 but this by itself was apparently not enough to set off the 
scientific revolution in the European Renaissance. Other factors were 
required, and much historical research may still be needed before we will 
know exactly which ones they are.7 In fact, one of the exciting tasks of 
historical research, as I see it, is to throw light on the developments — 
among them the scientific revolution — that within a few centuries 
changed the surface of the earth virtually beyond recognition (whether for 
better or for worse). 
 
2. Let me briefly touch here upon one other aspect of at least some 
scholarly discourse, but one which should interest us Indologists in 
particular: the interest in the history, and beyond that in the origin, of the 
ideas and institutions we study. Is this a feature which merely betrays the 
Western beginnings of our field of study? Is the quest for origins nothing 
but a heritage from the European romantic period, that should be discarded 
as soon as possible? 
 Recently Paul Harrison, a Buddhist scholar who teaches in New 
Zealand, published — in connection with his research into the origins of 
Mahåyåna — some reflections on the usefulness of this kind of 
investigations. Let me cite some parts:8 
 
Why indeed are we so interested in the origins of the Mahåyåna? Well, the 
fascination with origins, beginnings or sources does appear to be a kind of 
scholarly universal. Part of this — and this much is clear enough — is the idea 
that if we can understand the beginnings of something, we are better placed to 
understand the whole thing, as if its essential character were somehow fixed and 
readable in the genetic encoding of its conception. There is no doubt that such a 
view is problematic, i.e., it may not be the case that understanding the 
                                                
5 See Popper, 1959: 149 f. See further my forthcoming publication "Why is there philosophy in India?" 
6 See Eamon, 1994: 15-90. 
7 For a useful survey of the literature, see Cohen, 1994. 
8 Harrison, 1995: 49. 
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beginnings of the Mahåyåna (or even the beginnings of Buddhism as a whole) 
will give us privileged access to the mysteries of the later tradition, but I think 
the idea is still sufficiently compelling to result in a kind of methodological 
cliché. 
 
Harrison next emphasizes the personal and private need for knowing 
origins. He may be right in all this, but I have the impression that he 
overlooks one crucial point.9 Scholarship is not only concerned with 
collecting data, but also with understanding them. Besides the question 
"what?" there are the equally important questions "why?" and "how?". 
Scholarship can for example establish that there were Christians in India 
before the arrival of the Europeans; this is a fact. To explain this fact only 
one type of answer can satisfy us: information as to how they got there. No 
other kind of answer would work, and this has nothing to do with European 
influence on scholarship. More generally, human institutions of all kinds 
are characterized by the fact that many of their features (or at least some) 
are there simply because they were there earlier and no one bothered, or 
dared, to change them. Some of these features may have played a different 
role in earlier situations, and they may have been introduced at first for 
again different reasons. This does not mean that only history allows us to 
understand human institutions, but it does mean that, in order to reach as 
good an understanding as possible, at least some questions have to be 
addressed that involve the history of the institution concerned.10 
 
3. Let us now return to rationality. Rationality in the sense described 
above is not only found in Europe in the centuries preceding the present 
globalisation of science and scholarship. More in particular, it is not a 
foreign product that was introduced into India with modern scholarship. 
India has had a long rational tradition which has not, in my opinion, 
received the attention which it deserves.11 I am aware that the history of 
                                                
9 Harrison sums up his ideas on this matter in the following words (1995: 50): "As I see it, then, our 
fascination with the origins and early development of the Mahåyåna can be explained in terms of all these 
factors. That is to say, understanding this topic successfully will indeed help us to understand Buddhism 
better; it will help us grasp the lineage of East Asian Buddhism, and our own personal religious ancestry, 
if we happen to follow an East Asian Buddhist tradition; it will no doubt be productive of academic 
‘merit’; and it will yield considerable intellectual satisfaction. Yet these factors do not exhaust the 
question; there is always something left, some seductive magic that the subject holds for us as 
individuals." 
10 For a critical discussion of this issue with special reference to early Vaiße∑ika, see Houben, 1995. 
11 An exception is an article by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (1989), which emphasizes the 
presence of rational traditions in India. The authors conclude (p. 321): "our general conclusion regarding 
the often-aired conservationist worries about the ‘undermining’ of Indian culture due to the spread of 
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Indian thought is a rich field of research, with many specialists, some of 
them focusing on the history of logic, others on other aspects of critical 
thought. But how many researchers have ever expressed surprise about the 
fact that India has a rational tradition at all? Yet this may be far from self-
evident. Do all cultures have rational traditions? Is it self-evident that 
people enter into debate rather than ignoring, or aggressing, each other? I 
have the impression that rational traditions may be the exception rather 
than the rule. Even major cultures can survive for centuries, nay millennia, 
without them. The most striking example may be China. Sinologists such 
as A.C. Graham and François Jullien have commented upon the absence, or 
disappearance, of a rational tradition in China.12 We know of course, thanks 
to the researches of Joseph Needham and others, that China has made many 
important discoveries in the field of technology, but evidently this was 
possible without the presence of a strong tradition of rationality. 
 The fact that scholars have not expressed surprise at the discovery of 
a strong rational tradition in India may be due, ironically, to the Western 
background of modern scholarship. The European rational tradition, as is 
widely known, goes back to ancient Greece, and has continued — with 
more or less serious interruptions — until today. European scholars, and 
those influenced by them, may have found it self-evident to find something 
similar in India. If this is indeed the case, we may have here an example of 
how scholarship can be limited, and indeed prejudiced, by its historical 
background. It also suggests that new perspectives may show up if scholars 
from altogether different cultural backgrounds, and preferably with not too 
much Western cultural baggage, join in. What may we expect for Indology 
once there will be many Chinese trained Indologists (or for that matter for 
Sinology when many Indians will turn to this field of study)? I do not know 
the answer, but I do believe that a variety of approaches, questions and 
points of departure cannot but enrich the fields concerned. Note that this 
would be an enlargement of Indology in a rational direction, for rationality 
means: looking for suggestions and criticism from all directions. This is, 
incidentally, also my answer to the question raised at the beginning: do we 
need Western or Hindu Indology? My answer is: we need both, and much 
                                                                                                                                         
modern science and technology is that they may well be, to a great extent, seriously misleading. It is 
arguable that these worries are based on drawing alarmist inferences from an overly narrow and biased 
view of the nature of Indian culture, and also on ignoring the legitimacy, power, and reach of possible 
internal criticism of parts of the old tradition in the light of new information and understanding." 
12 Cp. Graham, 1989: 142; Jullien, 1995; and my forthcoming publication mentioned in note 5 above. For 
a recent discussion of the issue of rationality, see Goody, 1996: 26 f. 
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more, on condition that mutual criticism is seriously considered, not 
rhetorically, but by trying to understand the other's position and the 
arguments and evidence that support it. 
 How do we explain the presence of a tradition of rationality in India? 
Note that we are, once again, confronted with a question that appears to 
demand an answer in terms of origins. When did this tradition of rationality 
begin? We have relatively little difficulty in understanding that a rational 
tradition, once established, can maintain itself for a certain length of time. 
But how did it start? Rationality is conspicuous by its absence in Vedic 
literature, including the Upani∑ads. It is true that the Bråhmaˆas and 
Upani∑ads record a number of famous debates. But they cannot in any way 
be called rational in our sense of the term. No one, in these debates, is ever 
convinced by the arguments of his opponent, nor is the attempt made to 
bring this about. The winner of a debate is not the one who knows better, 
but the one who knows more.13 Logical argumentation is completely 
absent. Apodictic statements are accepted without resistance. Indeed, the 
teacher need not present arguments in support of his teaching, because the 
very idea that he might by mistake teach something that is incorrect, does 
not seem to have occurred to the thinkers of the Upani∑ads. Every thought 
is correct, but it may be insufficient, and may therefore have to be 
subordinated to the knowledge of the winner. Asking too many questions, 
on the other hand, can have dire results. One's head may be shattered, or 
one may loose one's head in a physically less violent manner.14 What is 
more, the Vedic examples all deal with knowledge which is "secret" in one 
way or another, known only to a few. 
 Rationality in the sense described above does not, therefore, seem to 
be present in Vedic literature, not even in the early Upani∑ads. When and 
why did it begin? This question has, to my knowledge, never been 
seriously addressed. Yet it seems to me a question of the greatest interest 
and importance. Unlike their Upani∑adic predecessors, the classical 
philosophers of India assiduously studied the works and arguments of their 
opponents, so much so that it is often hardly possible to understand texts 
belonging to one current of thought without knowing something about 
practically all the other ones. The ongoing debate between Buddhists and 
Naiyåyikas is a well-known example,15 but by far not the only one. And 
                                                
13 See Ruben, 1928. 
14 See Witzel, 1987, and Insler, 1990. 
15 Documented in Shastri, 1964. 
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even though the thinkers concerned may not be keen to admit this, it seems 
more than likely that they very often borrowed ideas from each other, 
modifying them so as to make them fit into their new surroundings.16 Why 
did these thinkers go through all this trouble? Couldn't they just ignore 
each other? To my knowledge no such intense intellectual interaction ever 
came about between Hindus and Moslims in later centuries. And indeed, 
Christians and Jews lived together for many centuries in Europe, yet their 
intellectuals hardly seem to have taken much notice of each other's views 
(with some few notable exceptions);17 unless, of course, we take the kind of 
interest into consideration which was expressed by king Louis IX 
(canonized as St. Louis) by saying, after a theological debate between 
Christians and Jews at Cluny, that the best way for a Christian to defend his 
faith against those people was "to thrust his sword into their entrails, as far 
as it would go".18 The Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina thinkers of 
classical India, on the other hand, were apparently greatly interested (i.e., 
intellectually interested) in each other. Why? 
 In this connection I would like to draw attention to a passage in 
Uddyotakara's Nyåyavårttika.19 Here Uddyotakara criticizes the Buddhist 
doctrine of No-Self (anåtman). One of the arguments he presents is that the 
Buddhists, by believing this, go against their own sacred texts. At this point 
Uddyotakara cites a text which it is not possible to locate in the surviving 
versions of Buddhist SËtras. But apparently the cited passage was not well-
known to the Buddhists in Uddyotakara's time either, for he says: "Don't 
say that this is not Buddha-word; it occurs in the Sarvåbhisamaya SËtra." 
The point I wish to make is that Uddyotakara took his opponents' position 
so seriously, that he was concerned to prove that it could not be in 
accordance with their own sacred tradition. And in order to prove this, he 
made what seem to be extensive searches in their sacred literature. Why did 
he do so? He could have saved himself much time and trouble by just 
ignoring the position of the Buddhists. What could he gain by this? The 
only answer that seems appropriate is that Uddyotakara, and his intended 
readership, weighed up the different arguments against each other. We do 
                                                
16 It will not be necessary to emphasize that this picture of the development of Indian thought goes against 
the traditional Brahmanical view of things. See in this connection Pollock, 1985, and the passage from 
Jayanta Bha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ which it cites on p. 516: "All sciences have existed, precisely like the 
Vedas, from the first creation. People, however, ascribe them to one or another human author who has 
sought to abbreviate or expand them." 
17 For some exceptions, see, e.g., Eco, 1995: 119 f. 
18 Olschki, 1960: 181 as cited in Batchelor, 1994: 83-84. 
19 Bronkhorst, 1997. 
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not know whether many people actually changed allegiance in the light of 
such arguments, but the very fact that they were studied shows that 
theoretically the possibility of a change of mind was not discarded. 
 
4. Note that the conviction that Indian philosophy is based on a rational 
tradition, i.e., a tradition of critical argumentation, rather than on mere 
revelation or inspiration, has methodological consequences for modern 
scholarship, too. A rational system of philosophy — or at least one which 
tries to be rational, to answer objections not by just quoting authority, but 
by taking the objections seriously — may be expected to be more or less 
coherent. When one is nonetheless confronted with some elements that do 
not fit in, one is then tempted to think that this is a leftover from an earlier 
stage of the system, which was coherent. This is the method applied by 
Erich Frauwallner, with impressive results as a whole.20 
 However, this method is based on the presupposition of rationality, 
which is no doubt valid for much of Indian philosophy during its classical 
period, but which is less certain for Indian philosophy in its early period 
and for schools of thought which had not joined the rational tradition. We 
have seen that Vedic literature appears to antedate the period of Indian 
rationality. And we do not know when exactly this changed. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that there is such a generally valid date at all. The Italian scholar 
Raffaele Torella has pointed out in a recent publication (1994: 
Introduction) how an initially obscure school of Íaivism managed, from 
the 10th century C.E. onward, to emerge into the open and escape from a 
merely restricted circle of adepts owing to the efforts of a series of 
remarkable thinkers — among them Somånanda and Utpaladeva. These 
thinkers carried out various tasks; Torella mentions exegesis of the 
scriptures, the reformulation of their teaching and the organizing and 
hierarchizing of their contents, extracting a homogeneous though varied 
teaching from the diverse texts; purging it, without changing its essential 
nature, of all that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle — in 
other words, of all that was bound to create an instinctive and 
insurmountable resistance — by attenuating the sharper points or removing 
every actually concrete aspect, and finally translating it into a discourse 
whose categories were shared by its addressees and engaging in a dialogue 
that would not be afraid to confront rival doctrines. In other words, this 
                                                
20 Houben, 1995: 722, 740, 742 f, 744 n. 43. 
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school of Kashmir Íaivism joined the rational tradition of India as late as 
the 10th century, even though it is known to have existed as a religious 
movement well before this time. Other schools may have joined this 
tradition at other times, before or after the 10th century, or they may have 
chosen to remain aloof throughout their history. 
 
5. With this in mind we may look at the Såµkhya system of 
philosophy. Several scholars have pointed out a peculiar feature of the 
classical system. Eli Franco (1991: 123 f.), like Paul Harrison a scholar 
who used to work in the southern hemisphere, describes it as follows: "One 
of the reasons why many of us feel uneasy with the Såµkhya philosophy is 
that we are never quite sure where we stand and whether the ancient 
teachers were talking psychology or cosmology. Typical psychological and 
individual terms like cognition, ego, mind, sense organs, and even hands, 
feet, tongue, anus and penis, become trans-individual and obtain 
cosmological dimensions."21 Franco, following the methodological 
principle just described, looks for an explanation of this strange situation in 
the historical background of the classical system: 
 
This somewhat confusing state of affairs is certainly the result of a long 
historical development. Såµkhya has probably started as a cosmology of two 
players, puru∑a and prak®ti, as male and female, passive and active, principles. 
This is quite clear from the very terms used for soul and matter — man and the 
procreating (woman) — as well as from the old metaphors which compare 
matter to an actress or a dancer and soul to a passive spectator, or to the chaste 
woman who is surprised naked by a stranger, etc. However, at a certain stage, 
probably under Vaiße∑ika influence as pointed out already by H. Jacobi, the 
plurality of the souls was introduced into the system. And this created the 
imbalance which is so peculiar to and characteristic of Såµkhya. Indeed, 
shouldn't every soul have its own mind, its own senses, etc.? What does it mean 
that two hands, two feet, one tongue, one penis and one anus are common to all 
of us? The next logical step was, of course, to introduce a plurality of prak®tis 
                                                
21 Hulin (1978: 73) speaks of "le paradoxe d'un Ego «cosmique», producteur des sens et des éléments 
matériels subtils, et non plus, semble-t-il, forme de la conscience de soi chez un individu concret". He 
then continues: "Cependant, aussi objectivé et dépersonnalisé soit-il, l'ahaµkåra n'en conserve pas moins, 
à l'intérieur du système Såµkhya, une face individuelle, subjective, puisqu'on lui associe constamment 
l'abhimåna, cette fonction de sur-estimation (de soi) qui lui sera désormais automatiquement attribuée. 
Comme on ne saurait évidemment pas se contenter de juxtaposer les deux aspects, cosmique et indi 
viduel, le problème se pose immédiatement de concevoir leur mode d'articulation." Parrott (1986) makes 
a brave, but unconvincing, attempt to solve the difficulty. 
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and to allow as many prak®tis as there are puru∑as. And as is well-known, the 
Såµkhya teacher Paurika has taken this step .... But Paurika's opinion did not 
prevail; it was rejected once and for all by the extremely influential Vår∑agaˆya, 
perhaps because he felt that admitting the plurality of prak®ti would be 
detrimental to its logical proofs, which were based on an opposition between the 
plurality of the products and the uniqueness of their manifested cause. 
 
There can be little doubt that classical Såµkhya is the result of a long 
historical development. But I fail to see why the earlier forms of Såµkhya 
must necessarily have been coherent. Supporting evidence for this can 
certainly not be derived from the fact that its descendant, i.e. classical 
Såµkhya, is not coherent. Indeed, if we assume that a rational tradition 
came to be established in India some time during the development of pre-
classical Såµkhya, we would expect more coherence the more we move 
forward in time. Given that even classical Såµkhya harbours a major 
inconsistency, what reason is there to expect that the earlier forms of 
Såµkhya fared any better? 
 Let me emphasize at this point that the historical study of thought 
does not have to presuppose rationality. In situations where this assumption 
seems justified, it can be of the greatest help in historical reconstructions. 
But also non-rational traditions of thought can be studied historically. This 
is not the occasion for an in-depth discussion, but I have to make the point 
to avoid misunderstanding. 
 Let us return to Såµkhya. Franco and others think that this school of 
thought was originally a cosmology, including a player who presumably 
was something like a world-soul.22 Certain thinkers then made the 
revolutionary step of introducing the notion of a multiplicity of souls in the 
place of the one world-soul, but did not dare to replace the single prak®ti 
with a plurality of prak®tis. 
 I do not know what evidence is supposed to support the claim that 
Såµkhya was originally only  a cosmology. All attempts to determine the 
earliest form of Såµkhya that I am aware of have been highly speculative, 
with far from certain results. Less uncertain is that the term Såµkhya in the 
Mahåbhårata refers to a method to reach liberation through knowledge. 
                                                
22 van Buitenen, 1988: 60 (originally published in 1957) observes: "There will be no one at present who 
seriously doubts that Såµkhya began by being theistic, in other words, by positing a cosmic person 
whose self-creation took place in series of evolutions ... ." But E.H. Johnston had still maintained (1937: 
17): "Early Såµkhya was in fact little concerned with the cosmos ... ." The question to be raised below is: 
do we have to make a choice? 
INDOLOGY AND RATIONALITY  11 
 
 
What kind of knowledge could have this effect? Edgerton offers the 
following specification in the Introduction to his book The Beginnings of 
Indian Philosophy (1965: 41): "The epic is like [the Upani∑ads] in 
regarding the soul as the essential part of man. But in emphasizing its 
distinction from what is body or non-soul, it often undertakes to analyse 
matter. The soul is unitary, undifferentiated, without qualities, and 
generally regarded as really inactive. It is immortal; when the body dies, 
the soul merely passes into another body; and it cannot be affected by 
anything physical ... . All acts are commonly said to be done by material 
nature, which appears in manifold forms and is constantly subject to 
change." Edgerton then distinguishes, and briefly describes, two different 
ways in which matter is analysed. One is by describing the three ‘strands’ 
(guˆa) which compose it. The second is ‘vertical’ and ‘quasi-evolutionary’: 
it approaches the classical enumeration of twenty-three or twenty-four 
‘essences’ (tattva), the soul being number twenty-five. 
 What is most interesting in this observation is its beginning. Epic 
Såµkhya is a method leading to liberation through knowledge, and it can 
be so because it teaches that the soul, i.e. the essential part of man, is 
inactive, and different from all that acts. This, of course, makes perfect 
sense against the background of the doctrine of karma. Actions lead to 
rebirth; the realization that one really does not act frees one from their 
effects. It seems to me more than likely that these epic conceptions are 
among the forerunners of classical Såµkhya. But these epic forerunners are 
not, or not only or even primarily, cosmologies. Quite on the contrary, they 
concern not the universe, but the individual. If, therefore, we stick to our 
rationalistic presupposition, we might have to assume that Såµkhya 
originally had a plurality of puru∑as and an equal number of prak®tis. 
 Such a conclusion might have to be drawn if we believe that already 
the forerunners of classical Såµkhya were rational in the sense described 
above and looked for coherence. But what reason is there to do so? Is it not 
equally conceivable that in those early days Såµkhya discourse concerned 
two different levels of reality at the same time? Examples of parallelisms 
between, and of identifications of, macrocosm and microcosm are 
numerous, both in Indian and in non-Indian religions. A well-known 
example comes from Buddhist cosmology. Here the universe is thought of 
as consisting of three layers, the kåmadhåtu, the rËpadhåtu, and the 
årËpyadhåtu. These layers are thought of in spatial terms, yet the rËpadhåtu 
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and the årËpyadhåtu correspond to attainments in meditation. Here too 
homology, or rather identification, between the profoundly personal and 
the cosmological is to be seen.23 Examples from Vedic literature, and even 
from classical Indian medicine (Óyurveda) are not lacking.24 The 
importance of homologization of the body with the macrocosm in Yoga 
and Tantrism has been emphasized by Mircea Eliade and others.25 Epic 
Såµkhya is inseparable from Yoga. Equally close to the historical 
predecessors of classical Såµkhya, the Bhagavadg¥tå describes how K®∑ˆa 
reveals to Arjuna the whole universe inside himself.26 Such identifications 
of different realms — usually the personal and the cosmological, 
microcosm and macrocosm — are not "rational" in our sense, because they 
can evoke tricky, or even unanswerable, questions, like the ones raised by 
Franco with regard to Såµkhya. Yet many religions, especially the ones in 
which rationality as here defined plays a less important role, have proved 
able to ignore or bypass such annoying questions. Why shouldn't we accept 
that this is precisely what the pre-classical Såµkhyas did? 
 It will be interesting to point out that the second flourishing of 
Såµkhya in the second millennium of the common era made an effort to 
rectify the lack of coherence that they apparently thought characterized the 
                                                
23 See the discussion in Gombrich, 1996: 83 ff. 
24 See, e.g., Carakasaµhitå, SËtrasthåna, chapter 12, and Filliozat, 1933. 
25 See Teun Goudriaan in Gupta, Hoens and Goudriaan, 1979: 57 f.: "The doctrine that the human body 
corresponds to, is even identical with, the universe is seldom systematically expounded but nearly always 
self-understood." "Microcosmic symbolism is especially prominent in the passages which deal with 
kuˆ∂alin¥yoga ..." "... very common ... is the outright equation of the body ... with the world or universe. 
We also find many statements to the purport that gods, heavens, hells etc. are all present in the body ..." 
"A consequence of the ‘cosmization’ of the individual is that the body is made to encompass the world of 
the gods in particular ways." etc. Padoux (1990: 78 n. 122) observes, similarly: "Íaiva cosmogony often 
appears as a ‘cosmization’ of psychological experiences and vice-versa." Heilijgers-Seelen (1994: 20 f.) 
draws attention to the fact that the five cakras, which are situated in the body, are given dimensions 
inspired by cosmological theories. A later commentator, she points out on p. 25 (with n. 20), 
distinguishes the macrocosm and the microcosm, where the text commented upon makes no such 
distinction. Man as Microcosm in Tantric Hinduism by Grace E. Cairns (New Delhi 1992) was not 
available to me. 
26 Mhbh 6.33 (= Bhag 11). Surprisingly, the Bhagavadg¥tå may be without the contradiction that mars 
classical Såµkhya. It appears to distinguish between the individual and the "godly" level, both of which 
interact in parallel but different ways with prak®ti. See e.g. Bhag 3.27-28, 30 (tr. Edgerton): "Performed 
by material nature's strands (guˆa) are actions, altogether; he whose soul is deluded by the I-faculty 
(ahaµkåra) imagines ‘I am the agent’. But he who knows the truth, great-armed one, about the separation 
[of the soul] from both the strands and action, ‘the strands act upon the strands’ — knowing this, is not 
attached [to actions]. ... On Me all actions casting, with mind on the over-soul, being free from longing 
and from selfishness, fight, casting off thy fever." (prak®te˙ kriyamåˆåni guˆai˙ karmåˆi sarvaßa˙/ 
ahaµkåravimË∂håtmå kartåham iti manyate// tattvavit tu mahåbåho guˆakarmavibhågayo˙/ guˆå guˆe∑u 
vartanta iti matvå na sajjate// ...// mayi sarvåˆi karmåˆi saµnyasyådhyåtmacetaså/ niråß¥r nirmamo 
bhËtvå yudhyasva vigatajvara˙//); and contrast this with Bhag 9.9-10 (tr. Edgerton): "And Me these 
actions do not bind, Dhanaµjaya, — participating as one indifferent, unattached to these actions. With 
Me as overseer, material nature brings forth [the world of] moving and unmoving [beings]; by this 
motive-force, son of Kunt¥, the world goes around." (na ca måµ tåni karmåˆi nibadhnanti dhanaµjaya/ 
udås¥navad ås¥nam asaktaµ te∑u karmasu// mayådhyak∑eˆa prak®ti˙ sËyate sacaråcaram/ hetunånena 
kaunteya jagad viparivartate//). 
INDOLOGY AND RATIONALITY  13 
 
 
classical school. Clearest in this respect is Vijñånabhik∑u's commentary on 
Såµkhya SËtra 3.10. It has been known for long that the Såµkhya SËtra 
was composed (or compiled) late, long after the Såµkhya Kårikå and most 
of its commentaries; its present form may date from the fourteenth or 
fifteenth century. Vijñånabhik∑u himself wrote in the sixteenth century. He 
speaks in this passage of the single (eka) subtle body (li∫ga) which is 
formed at creation and is an adjunct (upådhi) of Hiraˆyagarbha. This single 
subtle body subsequently divides into many (nånå) individuals, just as the 
single subtle body of a father becomes multiple in the form of the subtle 
bodies of his sons and daughters. This division of the subtle body of 
Hiraˆyagarbha is caused by the difference of karma of the individuals.27 It 
is true that Vijñånabhik∑u has a tendency to impose his own views on the 
Såµkhya philosophy, in particular the idea of a creator god. But his 
interpretation of Såµkhya SËtra 3.10 to the extent that one subtle body is 
subsequently divided into many individuals seems correct.28 A.B. Keith 
comments (1924: 108): "the SËtra evidently regards the whole process [of 
primary creation] as being a cosmic one, the principle of individuation 
producing cosmic organs, and elements, and the corresponding individual 
principles being derived from the cosmic. It is characteristic of the 
difficulty of the doctrine, and of its absurdity, that the explanation of the 
derivation is nowhere given: the SËtra (iii, 10) merely says that from the 
one psychic apparatus many were produced by reason of the difference of 
the works, an explanation which is subject to the disadvantage that it begs 
the question, since the distinction of works presupposes individuals, and 
individuals presuppose separate psychic apparatuses with which to perform 
works."29 This criticism may be justified. But here at least one knows at 
every step exactly what is being talked about, psychology or cosmology. 
So whatever further difficulties this position may entail, Franco's criticism, 
which I cited earlier, is no longer applicable here. We now know what is 
                                                
27 Vijñånabhik∑u on Såµkhya SËtra 3.10 (p. 190): nanu li∫gaµ ced ekaµ tarhi kathaµ puru∑abhedena 
vilak∑aˆå bhogå˙ syus tatråha: vyaktibheda°/ yady api sargådau hiraˆyagarbhopådhirËpam ekam eva 
li∫gam, tathåpi tasya paßcåd vyaktibhedo vyaktirËpeˆåµßato nånåtvam api bhavati/ yathedån¥m ekasya 
pit®li∫gadehasya nånåtvam aµßato bhavati putrakanyådili∫gadeharËpeˆa/ tatra kåraˆam åha: 
karmaviße∑åd iti/ j¥våntaråˆåµ bhogahetukarmåder ity artha˙/. Cp. Garbe, 1889: 211. 
28 SS 3.9-10: saptadaßaikaµ li∫gam/ vyaktibheda˙ karmaviße∑åt/. Aniruddha, though explaining SS 3.9 in 
a somewhat peculiar manner, agrees with this interpretation. 
29 The "probable explanation of the effort to fill up the system", as Keith (1924: 108) sees it, is "the fact 
that the Kårikå itself evidently allows organic nature to be in some way directly connected with nature, 
and not merely, as it should consistently be, derived for each individual from the fine elements which 
form part of his psychic apparatus". Áßvarak®∑ˆa could have avoided so many difficulties, if only he had 
asked Keith to write the Såµkhya Kårikå! 
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being talked about, but we are left with difficulties of understanding 
concerning the mechanism of the process described. 
 
6. In order to drive home the point that the assumption of irrational 
elements in classical Indian philosophies is far from unreasonable, I will 
now draw attention to a similar contradiction as the one found in classical 
Såµkhya in the thought of an altogether different thinker of classical India. 
Bhart®hari is often said to be a, or the, philosopher of grammar, but this 
does not do him full justice. Apart from the many schools of thought whose 
ideas he used to create his own system of thought, it should here be 
emphasized that he has been claimed by non-grammarians, too. At least 
one Buddhist is reported to have composed a commentary on his 
Våkyapad¥ya, and another one (I-ching) thought that Bhart®hari was a 
Buddhist himself. And the influence of Bhart®hari on Kashmir Íaivism is 
not to be ignored either. However that may be, Bhart®hari's Våkyapad¥ya 
confronts us with the same problem which also characterizes classical 
Såµkhya: It is not always clear whether the universe or an individual 
person is the subject of discussion. 
 In Bhart®hari's view of the world only the absolute, sometimes called 
Brahma, is real; the phenomenal world is not real. The multiplicity of the 
phenomenal world is primarily explained with the help of two factors: ßakti 
(energy, power) and language. The very first verse of the Våkyapad¥ya 
describes the relation between the absolute and its ßaktis:30 "It seems to be 
separate from its ßaktis, even though it is not separate [from them]." No 
complete enumeration of these ßaktis is given in the Våkyapad¥ya, but one 
gets the impression that they include the categories of Vaiße∑ika (or 
something corresponding to them).31 Prominent among them are, in any 
case, ‘direction’ (diß) or ‘ether’ (åkåßa), ‘time’ (kåla), ‘inherence’ 
(samavåya), and ‘substance etc.’ (dravyådi). The role of language in the 
creation of Bhart®hari's world is well-known. He goes to the extent of 
saying that the Veda is the creator (or organizer; vidhåt®) of the 
(phenomenal) world. This close link between words and things explains the 
"supernatural" effects of certain words or combination of words: they can 
                                                
30 Vkp 1.2cd: ap®thaktve 'pi ßaktibhya˙ p®thaktveneva vartate. 
31 This is suggested by Vkp 3.1.23 (... dravyådaya˙ sarvå˙ ßaktay[a˙] ...) and explicitly confirmed by 
Helåråja's commentary. 
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destroy poison, or produce merit which leads to heaven.32 In all this the 
individual plays no role. 
 The picture changes when we consider what the Våkyapad¥ya has to 
say about vikalpa. This word is used in various meanings, among them 
‘division’, ‘imagined division’, or ‘analytical imagination’. The things 
(bhåva) of this world are produced by vikalpa (vikalpotthåpita; VP 3.3.82), 
even though their essence (tattva) is beyond vikalpa (vikalpåt¥tatattva; VP 
3.6.25). Reality (tattva) is avikalpita ‘without vikalpa’, but it attains the 
form of vikalpa (vikalparËpaµ bhajate tattvam evåvikalpitam; VP 3.2.8). 
Real knowledge (vidyå) is free from the vikalpas of the traditions 
(anågamavikalpå ... vidyå; VP 2.233). For this reason, "he who knows that 
should not mentally analyze (vik÷p-), like the explanation in usual practice 
by common people of things the essence of which is inexplainable".33 This 
last remark suggests that there is a link between vikalpa and language. At 
the same time it assigns the activity of mentally analyzing clearly to the 
individual: the individual "who knows that" should stop mentally 
analyzing. This means of course that the individual "who knows that" can 
indeed stop dividing the world into objects. Note in this connection that 
verse 3.7.41 attributes the division of the world into objects to the inner 
organ (anta˙karaˆa):34 "Heaven, earth, wind, sun, oceans, rivers, directions; 
these are divisions of the reality belonging to the inner organ which 
[nonetheless] are situated outside." The fact that the individual can have 
control over his analytical imagination (vikalpa) allows him to put an end 
to this division of the world and reach liberation.35 
 The confusion is obvious. Either each individual divides the world 
into objects and whatever else fills the phenomenal world, or this division 
concerns all individuals at the same time, and is then transpersonal. If the 
powers of Brahma, or the Veda, create the world, it is hard to see how 
each, or any, individual can undo this. Rather than finding some more or 
less far-fetched explanation for this difficulty, it seems likely that 
Bhart®hari speaks in his Våkyapad¥ya about different levels of reality — 
the individual and the universal — at the same time. In doing so, he makes 
himself vulnerable to the same kind of criticism as classical Såµkhya. But 
                                                
32 On language in Bhart®hari, see Bronkhorst, 1996. 
33 Vkp 2.142: asamåkheyatattvånåm arthånåµ laukikair yathå/ vyavahåre samåkhyånaµ tatprajño na 
vikalpayet// 
34 Vkp 3.7.41: dyau˙ k∑amå våyur åditya˙ sågarå˙ sarito dißa˙/ anta˙karaˆatattvasya bhågå bahir 
avasthitå˙// 
35 On liberation in Bhart®hari, see Bronkhorst, 1996a. 
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by doing so, he strengthens our impression that the contradiction in 
Såµkhya is not the outcome of some historical development in which 
rationality somehow lost out. No, this contradiction was, if anything, a 
survival of pre-classical Såµkhya, which was not yet rational, in the sense 
that it did not yet, or not yet as much as later, try to immunize itself against 
criticism from outsiders. 
 The case of Bhart®hari is particularly interesting for the following 
reason. I pointed out earlier that certain thinkers of Kashmir Íaivism joined 
the rational fold rather late, in about the 10th century of the common era. I 
mentioned the names of two of these thinkers, Somånanda and Utpaladeva. 
The former of these two, Somånanda, was rather critical of Bhart®hari, but 
Utpaladeva appropriated his thought and incorporated many aspects of it in 
his own. However, Utpaladeva manages to avoid the contradiction which 
mars Bhart®hari's ideas. He does so by claiming that God's creation is 
essentially free from language, whereas the individuals' vikalpas impose 
upon their experience of the world the categories of language. Liberation of 
the individual takes place through the suppression of his or her vikalpas. 
Since the underlying world, created by God, is in itself not determined by 
these vikalpas, and by language in general, the liberation of one individual 
does not imply the destruction of the universe. Here then we see how 
Bhart®hari's thought came to be "rationalized" even further by a later 
thinker who makes use of it.36 
 
7. Here I wish to draw attention to one further current of Indian 
thought, the Yogåcåra school of Buddhism. It is well known that this 
school turned to idealism at some point of its history, but it is less generally 
realized that this idealism poses a serious difficulty of interpretation. It is 
Thomas E. Wood who has drawn attention to this difficulty in a recent 
publication (1991). He formulates the problem, and its solution as he sees 
it, in the beginning of his book in the following words (p. ix-x): 
 
First of all, the Vijñånavådins ... were not solipsists. Secondly, the 
Vijñånavådins did not believe that the world was in God's mind, nor did they 
believe it was in the mind of an Absolute. ... Consequently, the Vijñånavåda 
                                                
36 See, for details, my review article of Raffaele Torella's The Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå of Utpaladeva 
with the Author's V®tti (Bronkhorst, 1996b). 
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doctrine that the world is "nothing but mind" does not mean that the world is the 
manifestation or creation of some infinite or absolute mind. 
 If the world is mind only, and if the Vijñånavådins were neither solipsists, 
theists, nor absolutists, whose mind did they think the world was in? The answer 
... is as follows: The world exists (at least at the level of relative truth) in a 
multiplicity of independent minds. ... the experiences of these minds — or at 
least the experiences they have in the normal waking state — are coordinated 
with each other because these minds are in immediate, mind-to-mind contact. ... 
The world we seem to see in our waking state is in fact just as unreal as the 
things we dream about at night. The only difference is that objects seen in the 
normal, waking state are collectively hallucinated, whereas the things seen in 
dreams are not. 
 
The solution which Wood ascribes to the Yogåcåras he documents with 
references to texts such as Vasubandhu's Viµßatikå and its auto-
commentary. "[Vasubandhu's] view is that the representations (vijñapti) of 
the various mind streams mutually influence each other. Thus, he says, the 
characteristics or differentations (viße∑a) of one mind stream arise because 
of the viße∑as of the representation of another mind stream (saµtånåntara), 
and not because of the characteristics of an external object."37 However, 
Yogåcåra turned to its idealist position well before Vasubandhu, and there 
is no reason to think that Vasubandhu expressed the views of those 
preceding him. It seems far more likely that he "rationalized" the views of 
his predecessors. Earlier Vijñånavåda, it would seem, somehow did not yet 
face the difficulties inherent in an idealism without God or Absolute. If this 
is correct, it provides us with a further case where two different levels of 
reality, the individual and the universe, are confused. Further research may 
throw additional light on this issue.38 
 
8. Back to Såµkhya. I realize that classical Såµkhya can no longer be 
called "non-rational". During its classical period it had become a school of 
thought which fully participated in the rational developments that were 
                                                
37 Wood, 1991: 167. A note (n. 7 on p. 257) cites the auto-commentary on Viµßatikå 18: sarve∑åµ hi 
sattvånåm anyonyavijñaptyådhipatyena mitho vijñapter niyamo bhavati yathåyogam/ mitha iti 
parasparata˙/ ata˙ saµtånåntaravijñaptiviße∑åt saµtånåntare vijñaptiviße∑a utpadyate nårthaviße∑åt/. 
38 Perhaps the earliest testimony of Mahåyåna Buddhist idealism occurs in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-
saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra or Bhadrapåla SËtra (Schmithausen, 1973: 176 = 1976: 247). Harrison 
(1990: xx) points however out that this formulation of idealism "is not representative of the general tenor 
of the text. Rather, the attitude to phenomena propounded throughout the sËtra is one that we might 
characterise as essentially ÍËnyavådin".  
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taking place. Indeed, the contributions of Såµkhya to Indian logic have 
been studied, especially by Erich Frauwallner.39 And there can be no doubt 
that the classical Såµkhyas had become aware of the somewhat 
contradictory nature of their doctrine. Some, like Paurika, tried to solve it 
by postulating as many prak®tis as there are puru∑as.  
 Why, then, were the contradictory elements maintained? Why was 
Paurika's point of view not accepted? Franco suggests that it may have 
been rejected because admitting a plurality of prak®tis might be detrimental 
to its logical proofs, which were based on an opposition between the 
plurality of the products and the uniqueness of their unmanifested cause. I 
do not know whether this is the, or a, correct explanation of the situation, 
but I do think that an explanation, or explanations, must be looked for 
along such lines. Besides tradition, there must have been internal reasons to 
the system — rational reasons, if you like — which induced the Såµkhyas 
to hold on to such contradictory elements. The logical proof of prak®ti may 
have been one of them. Another one, I would like to suggest, is that the 
presence of one material and many spiritual principles can be used as an 
argument against idealism. This is what is done in Yoga SËtra 4.15-16 and 
in the Bhå∑ya thereon. The Yoga Bhå∑ya observes that one material reality 
(vastu) is shared by many minds (citta). This material reality has not been 
imagined (parikalpita) by one single mind, nor by many minds; stated 
differently: it is not imagined at all, it is real. It is therefore independent 
(svaprati∑†ha). The text goes on to explain that different minds derive from 
this single material reality pleasure, sorrow, confusion, or indifference, 
depending upon the presence in each mind of virtue (dharma), vice 
(adharma), ignorance (avidyå) or correct insight (samyagdarßana). Material 
reality and the minds go in this way their separate paths. This is precisely 
what sËtra 4.15 states: vastusåmye cittabhedåt tayor vibhakta˙ panthå˙. 
The Bhå∑ya on 4.16 adds that objective reality is common to all puru∑as 
and independent, whereas the minds, which too are independent, belong 
each to one puru∑a.40 
 
9. By way of conclusion, let me repeat that India has a long rational 
tradition. The study of this tradition is likely to be rewarding, as I have 
                                                
39 Frauwallner, 1958. 
40 It appears that the thinkers of classical Såµkhya became aware of the weakness of their system and 
tried to rectify the situation in various ad hoc ways. A investigation of these "solutions" will be published 
under the title "The contradiction of Såµkhya: on the number and the size of the different tattvas". 
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tried to show with the help of some examples. At least as important is that 
this shared tradition of rationality, both in India and in the West, should 
enable researchers to work together rather than against each other. The 
main characteristic of a rational tradition is that no one can claim to have 
privileged access to the object of study, that everyone is ready to listen to 
criticism and to consider it seriously. In the end there is no point of view to 
be defended, for every point of view should be abandoned in the face of 
sufficient contrary evidence. Mutual criticism is to be encouraged, for it is 
the only way to make progress, to move closer towards the aim of our 





Batchelor, Stephen (1994): The Awakening of the West: The encounter of Buddhism 
and western culture. Berkeley, California: Parallax Press. 
Bono, James J. (1995): The Word of God and the Languages of Man. Interpreting 
nature in early modern science and medicine. I: Ficino to Descartes. University 
of Wisconsin Press. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1989): "L'indianisme et les préjugés occidentaux." Études de 
Lettres (Revue de la Faculté des lettres, Université de Lausanne), avril juin 
1989, pp. 119-136. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996): "Sanskrit and reality: the Buddhist contribution." 
Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the history of the Sanskrit 
language. Ed. Jan E.M. Houben. Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill. Pp. 109-135. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996a): "Studies on Bhart®hari, 7: Grammar as the door to 
liberation." ABORI 76 (1995 [1996]), 97-106. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996b): "The self as agent: a review article." AS 50(3), 603-621. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1997): "L'Inde classique et le dialogue des religions." AS 50(4) 
(1996 [1997]). 
Cohen, H. Floris (1994): The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. 
Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. 
Eamon, William (1994): Science and the Secrets of Nature. Books of secrets in 
medieval and early modern culture. Princeton University Press. 
Eco, Umberto (1995): The Search for the Perfect Language. Oxford UK & Cambridge 
USA: Blackwell. (Translated from the original Italian (1993) by James 
Fentress.) 
Edgerton, Franklin (1944): The Bhagavad G¥tå, translated and interpreted. (HOS 38 & 
39.) Reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1994. 
Edgerton, Franklin (1965): The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy: Selections from the 
Rig Veda, Atharva Veda, Upani∑ads, and Mahåbhårata, translated from the 
Sanskrit with an introduction, notes and glossarial index. London: George Allen 
& Unwin. 
Eliade, Mircea (1958): Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. Translated from the French by 
Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books.  (Bollingen Series, 56.) 
Filliozat, Jean (1933): "La force organique et la force cosmique dans la philosophie 
médicale de l'Inde et dans le Véda." Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
l'Étranger 115, 410-429. 
Franco, Eli (1991): "Whatever happened to the Yuktid¥pikå." WZKS 25, 123-138. 
INDOLOGY AND RATIONALITY  20 
 
 
Frauwallner, Erich (1958): "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Såµkhya-Systems." 
WZKSO 2, 84-139. KlSchr pp. 223-278. 
Garbe, Richard (1889): Sâµkhya-pravacana-bhâshya, Vijñânabhikshu's Commentar zu 
den Sâmkhyasûtras, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen. 
Leipzig. Genehmigter Nachdruck: Kraus Reprint Ltd., Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 
1966. 
Gellner, Ernest (1995): Anthropology and Politics. Revolutions in the Sacred Grove. 
Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell. 
Gombrich, Richard F. (1996): How Buddhism Began. The conditioned genesis of the 
early teachings. London & Atlantic Highlands: Athlone. (Jordan Lectures 1994.) 
Goody, Jack (1996): The East in the West. Cambridge University Press. 
Graham, A.C. (1989): Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. 
La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. xii + 502 pp. 
Gupta, Sanjukta; Hoens, Dirk Jan; Goudriaan, Teun (1979): Hindu Tantrism. Leiden 
etc.: E.J. Brill. (HdO II, 4, 2.) 
Harrison, Paul (1990): The Samådhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Pre 
sent: An annotated English translation of the Tibetan version of the 
Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saµmukhåvasthita-Samådhi-SËtra. Tokyo: The 
International Institute for Buddhist Studies. (StPhB, Monograph Series, V.) 
Harrison, Paul (1995): "Searching for the origins of the Mahåyåna: what are we looking 
for?" EB (N.S.) 28(1), 48-69. 
Heilijgers-Seelen, Dory (1994): The System of Five Cakras in Kubjikåmatatantra 14-
16. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. (Groningen Oriental Studies, 9.) 
Houben, Jan E.M. (1995): "Liberation and natural philosophy in early Vaiße∑ika: some 
methodological problems." AS 48(2), 1994 [1995], 711-748. 
Hulin, Michel (1978): Le principe de l'ego dans la pensée indienne classique: la notion 
d'ahaµkåra. Paris: E. de Boccard. (PICI 44.) 
Insler, Stanley (1990): "The shattered head split and the Epic tale of Íakuntalå." BEI 7-
8 (1989-1990), 97-139. 
Johnston, E.H. (1937): Early Såµkhya: An essay on its historical development 
according to the texts. Reprint Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974. 
Jullien, François (1995): Le détour et l'accès: Stratégies du sens en Chine, en Grèce. 
Paris: Bernard Grasset. 
Keith, A. Berriedale (1924): The Så◊khya System. A history of the Så◊khya 
philosophy. Oxford University Press. 
Lloyd, G.E.R. (1987): The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the claims and practice 
of ancient Greek science. University of California Press. (Sather Classical 
Lectures, 52.) 
Lloyd, G.E.R. (1990): Magie, raison et expérience: Origines et développement de la 
science grecque. Traduit de l'anglais par Jeannie Carlier et Franz Regnot. 
Flammarion. 
Nussbaum, Martha C., and Sen, Amartya (1989): "Internal criticism and Indian 
rationalist traditions." Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Ed. Michael 
Krausz. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Pp. 299-325. 
Olschki, Leonardo (1960): Marco Polo's Asia. Berkeley / Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Padoux, André (1990): Våc. The concept of the word in selected Hindu Tantras. Transl. 
Jacques Gontier. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Parrott, Rodney J. (1986): "The problem of the Såµkhya tattvas as both cosmic and 
psychological phenomena." JIP 15, 55-77. 
Pollock, Sheldon (1985): "The theory of practice and the practice of theory in Indian 
intellectual life." JAOS 105(3), 499-519. 
Popper, Karl R. (1959): "Back to the Presocratics." Reprinted in: Conjectures and 
Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. Fourth edition. London and 
Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981. Pp. 136-165. 
INDOLOGY AND RATIONALITY  21 
 
 
Råmånuja: Ír¥ Bhå∑ya. Edited, with his commentary Bhå∑yårtha Darpaˆa, by Uttamur 
T. Viraraghavacharya. Part I-II. Madras: Sreevathsa Press. 1963-1964. 
Ruben, Walter (1928): "Über die Debatten in den alten Upani∑ad's." ZDMG 83, 238-
255. 
Schmithausen, Lambert (1973): "Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im 
Buddhismus." ZMR 57, 161-186. 
Schmithausen, Lambert (1976): "On the problem of the relation of spiritual practice and 
philosophical theory in Buddhism." German Scholars on India. Contributions to 
Indian studies edited by the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, New Delhi. Vol. II. Bombay - Delhi. Pp. 235-250. 
Shastri, Dharmendra Nath (1964): Critique of Indian Realism. A study of the conflict 
between the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika & the Buddhist Dignåga school. Agra University. 
Torella, Raffaele (1994): The Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå of Utpaladeva with the author's 
V®tti. Critical edition and annotated translation. Roma: IsMEO. (SOR, LXXI.) 
van Buitenen, J.A.B. (1988): Studies in Indian Literature and Philosophy: Collected 
articles. Ed. Ludo Rocher. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Vijñånabhik∑u: Såµkhya SËtra Bhå∑ya. In: Mahar∑ikapilapraˆ¥taµ Såµkhyadarßanam, 
Aniruddha-k®tå ‘V®tti˙’, Vedåntimahådeva-k®to ‘V®ttisåra˙’, Vijñånabhik∑u-
k®taµ ‘Bhå∑yam’, Någeßabha††a-k®to ‘Bhå∑yasåraß’ ceti vyåkhyåcatu∑†ayopetaµ 
Devat¥rthasvåmi-k®tena Så∫khyatara∫geˆa, Sarvopakåriˆ¥-sahitena 
TattvasamåsasËtreˆa, vividhaparißi∑†aiß ca samupab®µhitam. Sampådaka˙ 
Janårdanaßåstr¥ Påˆ∂eya˙. Delhi etc.: Motilal Banarsidass. 1989. 
Wezler, Albrecht, and Witzel, Michael (1995): "Foreword to the Series." In: The Indo-
Aryans of Ancient South Asia: Language, Material Culture and Ethnicity, ed. 
George Erdosy, Berlin - New York: Walter de Gruyter. (Indian Philology and 
South Asian Studies, 1.) 
Witzel, Michael (1987): "The case of the shattered head." StII 13/14, 363-415. 
Wood, Thomas E. (1991): Mind Only: A philosophical and doctrinal analysis of the 
Vijñånavåda. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. (Society for Asian and 





ABORI  Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 
AS  Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern 
BEI  Bulletin d'Études Indiennes, Paris 
Bhag  Bhagavadg¥tå 
EB  The Eastern Buddhist, KyØto 
HdO  Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden 1952 ff. 
HOS   Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge Mass. 
IsMEO  Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Roma 
KlSchr  Kleine Schriften [in der Serie der Glasenapp-Stiftung], 
Wiesbaden, Stuttgart 
Mhbh  Mahåbhårata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar u.a., Poona 1933-41 
(BORI) 
N.S.  Neue Serie, New Series 
PICI  Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Paris 
SOR  Serie Orientale Roma, Roma 
SS  Såµkhya SËtra (for the edition, see Vijñånabhik∑u) 
StII  Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 
StPhB  Studia Philologica Buddhica, Tokyo 
Vkp  Bhart®hari, Våkyapad¥ya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977 
ZDMG  Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 
Leipzig, then Wiesbaden 
INDOLOGY AND RATIONALITY  22 
 
 
ZMR  Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissen 
schaft, Münster 
 
